History revisited - the Premier greenlight's self-government referendum; the movement squibs

GAINING GROUND: NSW Premier Bertram Stevens (photo) tells Michael Bruxner he could have his referendum on self-government, but with decreasing support and continuing disputes over boundaries, Bruxner feared to put the matter to the test, a decision he would come to regret.  

In October 1931, the dream of self government for New England seemed within reach. The various new state movements had combined to form the United Country Movement with the United Country Party as its political wing, while all the non-Labor groups had agreed that new states should be a key plank in their combined platform.

David Drummond, the member for Armidale, had played a deciding role in those complex negotiations.

Unlike Page, Hardy or (to a lesser extent) Bruxner, Drummond was not a mass agitator. He had deliberately turned himself into a good stump speaker, perhaps better than Page or Bruxner in terms of delivery and clarity, but he lacked the emotional spark that allowed the others to sweep a crowd before them. He was too concerned to explain, to appeal to the intellect rather than the emotions of his audience. In a very real sense he wanted to teach his audience just as he had so painstakingly taught himself. 

These weaknesses were offset by a very major strength, his ability to give form and coherence to ideas and organisations. He was also trusted. In the chaotic conditions of the time, it was these strengths that were most needed. Drummond had played a key role in creating unity among the country movements. Now he would try to steer the cause through the next stages.

The December 1931 Federal elections saw the first setback. The unity that had been established among the non-Labor forces was swept aside in sometimes bitter campaigning, with Joseph Lyons able to establish a majority United Australia Party government in January 1932 excluding Page and the Country Party.

In NSW, the Governor Sir Philip Game dismissed Jack Lang on 13 May 1932. Early in 1931, the New England and Riverina Movement had been prepared to secede. Later, in changing circumstances, the decision had been reached that they would act if Premier Lang again breached the constitution.

Page saw Lyons in Melbourne. Lyons told Page quite bluntly that if New England did secede, he might be forced to call in the army. The movement temporized. There was still willingness to act, but only in the right circumstances. Game’s dismissal of Lang ended that option. They had waited too long, something many would regret. 

The NSW state elections of June 1932 saw Labor swept from power. On 23 August 1933, Justice H.S. Nicholas was appointed to determine the areas of NSW suitable for self-government.

After his earlier experience with his successful move to create the disastrous Cohen Royal Commission, Drummond was taking no chances. Not only was Nicholas carefully selected, but Drummond demanded answers in writing from Nicholas over his scope and role. The question of suitability was out. The only issue was definition of boundaries.

The first hearings were held on 18 October 1933, with Drummond organising the various movement responses. The fervour that had marked 1931 and 1932 was gone. Opposition emerged, with the position of the powerful Norco dairy cooperative particularly problematic for it feared the loss of the Sydney milk market.

Nicholas reported in 1935. He found that two areas would be suitable for self-government as States within the Commonwealth of Australia, a northern region, and a central, western and southern region, with descriptions of the boundaries of each region listed.

NSW Premier Bertam Stevens told Bruxner that he could have his referendum on self-government. With enthusiasm down as well as continuing disputes over boundaries, Bruxner feared to put the matter to the test.

Bruxner would come to deeply regret this decision. But, for the present, the cause had ended. It would be ten years before agitation re-surfaced.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 17 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the series.

Working Post - the counter culture movement in Australia's New England 1 - Introduction

In 1972, scouts from the Australian Union of Students came to the village and persuaded the Nimbin Progress Association to allow a festival to be held there. The result in 1973 was a ten day festival – the Aquarius Festival, a celebration of the dawning of the `Consciousness' and `Protest' movements in the heady days of the Vietnam war, free love and marijuana - a festival of discovery. The photo shows domes at the  Festival.

Nimbin entered Australian popular culture as a potent symbolic marker. However, it was more than that. From a New England historical perspective, it was a major marker that, in combination with other changes, shifted the local historical narrative. From an Australian perspective, it was the local manifestation of a global change process.

This post is the first part of a series tracing these changes. It will evolve over the next week or so as I sketch out patterns. As I add posts in the series, I will reference them here so that you can follow the story through. 

History revisited - Lyons splits the ALP: deal seems to place New England self-government within reach

1931 was a remarkably complicated year. My focus is on the fight for New England self-government, but that fight was taking place against a backdrop of economic and political turmoil that would reshape the Australian political landscape.

From 15 March 1931, NSW began to systematically default on interest payments, forcing the Commonwealth to make the payments instead. By the end of June, the net total paid out by the Commonwealth had reached nearly four million pounds. In June, Premier Lang accepted the Premiers’ economic reconstruction plan but still had no intention of resuming interest payments.

By the end of June, the State’s financial position had deteriorated to the point where, even after non-payment of interest, public service salaries could not be met from mid July. In response, the Lang Government introduced emergency legislation increasing income taxes by between 60 and 75 per cent. 

The defeat of this legislation forced NSW to go cap in hand to the Loan Council seeking financial support. The price was resumption of interest payments, together with Lang’s implementation of the Premiers Plan.

Under pressure, the Australian Labor Party splintered into Lang and anti-Lang factions, while Joseph Lyons (photo) led a group out of the Party to form a new party, the All for Australia League. In May 1931, the Lyons block merged with the Nationalist Party to form the United Australia Party (UAP) with Lyons as leader.

Hurt by internal dissent and facing a hostile Senate, the Scullin Labor Government became increasingly helpless. Late in 1931, the Lang supporters in the Federal Parliament combined with the UAP to defeat the Government and force an early election.

At local level, the New England leadership in April 1931 faced four related problems.

They had first to consolidate support for the separatist cause in the North. Secondly, they had to reach some measure of agreement with the other country movements as to organization, objectives and method or risk destruction by country in-fighting. Thirdly, the future relationship (if any) between the Country Party and country movements had to be defined. Finally, there was the continuing problem, how to push the separatist cause to a successful conclusion.

There is only space here to sketch key features. On 28 April at a first unity conference, the four new state movements agreed a common platform, although differences remained. This was followed by a second unity conference on 18 June that resolved remaining differences and created a central council. Then on 14 and 15 August complex and sometimes difficult negotiations saw the creation of a United Country Movement with the Country Party as its political wing.

In October, a unity meeting between all the main non-Labor forces led to the creation of a coalition agreement in which all parties including the United Australia Party adopted the Country Party platform including new states.

Action to achieve self-government for New England appeared within reach. It was not to be quite as easy as that.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 10 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,. 

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the series.

History revisited - NSW to be torn apart by five state solution

New Englanders know this place, the NSW Parliament, as their present parliament. It might not have been been, may not be in future.

The tumultuous early months of 1931 had seen the emergence of four self government movements – New England, Riverina, Monaro-South Coast and Western. This implied a five state solution, with NSW reduced to Sydney, the Central Coast and Blue Mountains with still to be defined northern and southern boundaries.

The relative size and economic power of the five areas varied, but the structure did make basic sense in geographic terms. You can see this clearly if you map the various administrative boundaries used by Sydney over time to govern a large and disparate state. Boundaries vary, but they all generally link to this five-fold division.

The evolving structure may have made sense in geographic terms, but there were considerable differences between and as well as divisions within the various movements. This was especially true for the newly re-emerged Riverina and long established New England movements.

The idea of provincial councils had become well established. During the decentralization movements of the 1880s, the idea of creating provinces within NSW had been put forward as an alternative to new colonies. Then in 1925 the Cohen Commission had concluded that the creation of provincial councils within NSW would address country grievances.

The provincial council idea was further extended by those who supported the abolition of the states and their replacement by provinces with delegated powers, a position adopted by the Federal Labor Party.

There had always been considerable support within the Riverina for the provincial councils’ model. Now in reaction to the Lang Plan, many representative argued that the only solution to the problem of a renegade state was the replacement of states by provinces.

The Northern position, carefully articulated by David Drummond in the aftermath of the Cohen Commission, was different. Provincial councils with delegated powers could not work, Drummond argued, because the central government would always override them as its political imperatives demanded. The only solution was to give the states (or provinces) their own powers.

In addition to differences on constitutional issues, the Riverina Movement was strongly influenced by anti-party, anti-political populist ideas that had flowered under the impact of Depression, leading it to adopt radical positions. These ideas were present within New England populism as well, but there they were tempered by and fitted within an articulated institutional and constitutional position

Personalities compounded the differences. Riverina leader Charles Hardy was younger, less experienced, brash. His offer to Page to campaign in New England ‘to stir up the people’ was greeted with indignation, compounding the personal tensions between Page, Bruxner and Hardy.

The political outlook seemed clouded in the extreme. It was left to David Drummond to find a way through the maze.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 3 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,. 

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the

History revisited - other regions join the fight for separation

The 28 February 1931 Armidale meeting had placed the Northern Separatist Movement on the radical path proposed by Earle Page. But another and more radical movement was emerging that would create opportunities and challenges for the Northern separatist cause.

The Riverina Separatist Movement had collapsed following the 1925 Cohen Commission Report. However, Riverina’s political grass had now become tinder dry, ready to burn.

The Depression induced collapse in commodity prices caused acute distress in farming regions. Farmers were angry about the Depression related tariff increases that raised their costs. Then, in 1930, the Federal Government launched a disastrous grow more wheat campaign in an attempt to increase Australia’s export income. Increased production drove prices down, adding to wheat growers’ financial woes.

The Farmers and Settlers’ and Graziers’ Associations combined to form a new body, the Producers’ Advisory Council, to organise country interests. The Council held protest meetings across NSW demanding reduced Government spending, taxation and tariff protection.

The Council met with greatest success in the wool and wheat districts of the Central West and Riverina, areas hit hard by the grow more wheat campaign. In so doing, it prepared the way for a new Riverina Movement led by Charles Hardy, a Wagga Wagga timber merchant.

The thirty two year old Hardy had played a major role in Riverina activities, establishing a wide network of friends and contacts. A man of great personal charm with a magnetic personality, Hardy also proved to be talented agitator.

On 8 February 1931, a week before Page’s Glenreagh speech, thirty men from various parts of the Riverina including Hardy met in Wagga Wagga to consider what action might be taken in view of the deteriorating political and economic circumstances. They decided to adopt the Producers’ Advisory Council platform and to hold two mass protest meetings, one at Wagga on 28 February, a second at Narranderra on 7 March.

The next day NSW Premier Jack Lang announced the Lang Plan. As had happened in the North, this electrified the political situation. On 28 February, the day of the Armidale meeting, 10,000 people gathered on the banks of Murrumbidgee River near Wagga.

The first motion calling on the Government to affect immediate and drastic reductions in the cost of government, to relieve primary producers from statutory burdens and to prepare proposals for drastic reductions in interest rates was carried with wild cheers.

A second motion was then carried stating that if the Government did not accede to these wishes by 31 March, a referendum should be held on the question of Riverina secession. On 7 March, a 5,000 strong mass meeting at Narranderra carried similar motions.

Driven by Hardy, the new movement spread rapidly across the Riverina, with sister movements springing up in the West and Monaro. A new force had been born. 

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 26 November 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series

History revisited - Page loses key lieutenant

The period leading up to Page’s 17 February 1931 Glenreagh speech had seen some feverish behind the scenes activity.

On 30 November 1930, the President of the Farmers and Settlers Association at Murwillumbah had telegraphed Page asking that he and Victor Thompson organise a conference ‘with a view to declaring northern new state’. Page telegraphed back, promising to place the telegram before a meeting of the Northern members of the NSW Parliament.

Page had some difficulties in gathering the members together. It was not until 30 January 1931 that he met with David Drummond and Alf Pollack (the member for Clarence: photo) at Cremorne in Sydney to discuss strategy. Unfortunately. Pollack died suddenly later that day.

Politics is about people. The ideas and enthusiasm generated by the mercurial Page had considerable impact. As Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Treasurer he failed to create Australia’s first national superannuation scheme. Later, he would create the first national health scheme. Yet he depended on others to provide form and the supporting under-pinning required to make his ideas work.

A solicitor, Pollack had been to school at Grafton and Armidale before establishing his practice in Grafton. He had been a key Page lieutenant since at least 1915 when the dispute over the Helen river ferry launched the first twentieth century Northern separation campaign. Like Drummond, Pollack one was of those who provided practical grounding to Page’s enthusiasms. His death left a considerable gap.

A week after Pollack’s death, the announcement of the Lang Plan electrified the situation. On 13 February, Page came to Sydney to present his plans to colleagues on the action to be taken if Premier Lang carried out his threat to repudiate interest payments on the State’s overseas debt.

There were considerable reservations. Nevertheless, Page was given his head, while the decision was made to call a special meeting of the Northern New State Executive to be held in Armidale on 28 February 1931 to consider Page’s ideas.

While still technically an Executive meeting, the 28 February meeting was now being treated as a full Movement convention. That Saturday more than 200 delegates gathered to hear Page unveil his plans. The North should organise itself, Page said, ‘into a self-governing unit, demand recognition from the Federal Government on the ground that we intend to obey the Federal law and Constitution and pay our debts.’

In Drummond’s view, Page made an important tactical error her. The issues were so clear-cut to Page that he forgot that many delegates were hearing his plans for the first time. They were understandably cautious about a course of action so clearly smacking of rebellion. Finally, after protracted discussion and with some misgivings and private reservations, the delegates carried a series of resolutions that placed the Movement on the path that Page proposed. These included adoption for the first time of the name New England to describe the entire North.

Meantime, another movement was emerging that would create opportunities and challenges for the Northern separatist cause.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 19 November 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,. 

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series

History revisited – as society fragments, movements begin to form

My last column outlined some of the economic and political events leading into the Great Depression. In the economic and political turmoil of 1930 and 1932 the very fabric of NSW life began to collapse. Many blamed the existing politicians and political parties for the problems and condemned them, calling for new approaches.

New political movements now mushroomed on the right and left of politics. Formed in February 1931, the All for Australia League claimed a membership of 130,000 by the end of June. The Unemployed Workers Movement formed in April 1930 claimed a membership of 31,00o by the middle of 1931. A strong undercurrent of fear ran beneath this political activity.

As the fear of revolution spread, private citizens began to arm, forming unofficial paramilitary organisations. On 18 February 1931, just nine days after Lang announced the Lang Plan, a private meeting of eight men at the Imperial Services Club in Sydney decided to form the New Guard. In less than a year, the Guard had grown to 87,000 men. The photo shows New Guard Leader Eric Campbell leading a fascist salute. 

The Guard courted publicity, and this has given it a faintly comic air. However, it was arguably very dangerous; its strident rhetoric was associated with a well organised military structure, largely in Sydney, that might have allowed it to seize power.

Less flamboyant than the New Guard was the shadowy organisation known as the “Movement” to its members. Formed in November 1930 the Movement, later derisively called the Old Guard by its New Guard rivals, aimed to build up a disciplined force of 9,000 men who would only be called out in the event of a situation beyond police control.

While the strength of para-military forces in the North is difficult to gauge, it is clear that units were formed. However, although there appear to have been small New Guard branches at Lismore and Newcastle, the great majority of Northern groups were almost certainly independent or associated in some way with the Old Guard rather than the more efficient and extreme New Guard.

It is also reasonably clear that the Northern separatist leadership had at least had some knowledge of, if not connections with, the Old Guard. This is hardly surprising, given the number of ex-military officers connected in some way with the Northern New State Movement, for these formed the core of the Old Guard.

Nevertheless, whatever the strength or indeed affiliations of Northern para-military groups, their very existence was an important influence in the increasingly confused political climate of 1931 and early 1932.

In these circumstances, Page’s 17 February 1931 Glenreagh speech calling on the North to secede was not just a dramatic gesture. It was very close to a formal call to arms, a call for revolution.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 12 November 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series

History revisited – great depression brings divides on left and right

The fire ignited by Earle Page’s 17 February 1931 Glenreagh call for the people of the North to secede from New South Wales drew its strength in part from the now established desire for self-government for the North, more from the social and political tensions unleashed by the Great Depression.

At the outbreak of war in 1914, Australia’s population was just 4.9 million. During the war, 420,000 Australians enlisted, equivalent to 38.7 per cent of the male population. Some 60,000 died, others were wounded or became sick. Including deaths, wounded and sickness, the Australian casualty rate reached 64.8 per cent.

Many Australians returning from the front found readjustment to civilian life difficult. They provided a force for change that helped fuel many of the political movements including the rising Country Party and a resurgent Northern Separation Movement.

There were divisions on the right and left, fuelled in part by the rise of Bolshevism and the success of the Russian Revolution. The radicals looked to the possibility of change, the conservatives feared the overthrow of the existing order.

While the roaring twenties were nowhere near as prosperous as the label would suggest, economic growth was sufficient to contain the underlying divisions. However, that growth was patchy and built on unstable foundations.

Rising tariff protection encouraged expansion of manufacturing. In 1925-26 manufacturing employment exceed rural for the first time. Industrialisation was associated with and assisted by heavy expenditure on public works such as railways, electricity, roads and sewerage. The pattern of industrialisation and public works led to further growth in the metropolitan cities.

Metropolitan population growth became self-generating, for the need to house rising city populations added thousands more jobs in building and construction. Productivity growth in manufacturing was extremely low, import competition rising despite rising tariffs.

Industry responded by trying to control or even cut wages, which in turn led to continuing industrial trouble. Meantime, the rising drift of population to the city together with the cost squeeze placed upon primary export industries as a consequence of rising input costs began to fuel a new wave of country political agitation.

In 1929, the economic house of cards collapsed. The previous year new overseas borrowings to fund Government public works programs had reached fifty-two million pounds, while interest payments on accumulated loans had reached 28 per cent of export income.

The perfect economic storm that now descended combined falling commodity prices with the closure of the London markets to new borrowings. Public works ground to a halt, while Governments were forced into a desperate search for solvency leading to Greek style expenditure cuts.

Unemployment rose and rose again, reaching 23.4 per cent by the end of 1930. As economic conditions worsened, previously submerged social and political tensions emerged. Australian society began to fragment.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 5 November 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series

Nathan Wise on the failure in soldier settlement after World War One

Short post to just to provide a link to a radio interview with UNE's Nathan Wise on the failure of soldier settlement after World War One.

History revisited – battling for self-government in the North

“In a fiery speech, Earle Page calls on the people of the North to secede.”

Glenreagh, Tuesday 17 February 1931. In a fiery speech, Earle Page calls on the people of the North to secede.

Eleven days earlier (6 February), the Premiers had met in Canberra to discuss a three year plan to rectify the economic situation. Federal Treasurer E G Theodore had suggested that a new and expansionary monetary policy should be adopted. NSW Premier Jack Lang, a bitter political rival, responded with his own plan, one that came as a surprise even to his own State party.

Under the Lang Plan, payment of interest to British bond-holders would cease pending re-negotiation of the loans on satisfactory terms; interest on all government borrowings would be reduced to 3 per cent; while the gold standard would be replaced by an undefined “goods standard.” What came to be known as the battle of the plans had begun.

Now in response, Page declared that the “people of the North seem to have no other course but to cut adrift from New South Wales. The people of Northern New South Wales refuse to have any part of or lot in this matter of default.” They would request recognition from the Federal Parliament as state that “would be organised under a Provisional Government pending adjustment of relationships and liabilities with New South Wales”.

This appeal, Page went on, would be “on all fours with the appeal of West Virginia” which was recognised by Abraham Lincoln as a separate state when it declared for the Federal Union.

Reaction to the Page speech was instantaneous, if mixed.

“Divorce is ever a tragedy and a confession of failure!”, wrote the newly arrived Anglican Bishop of Armidale John Stoward Moyes in an open letter to the Northern press. “I hope, gentlemen, that deep loyalty to the nation will forbid the people of the North to be beguiled by such sinister proposals”. Later Moyes, convinced at last that the existing system needed changing, would join the New State executive.

The Armidale Express, while sympathetic, warned that the proposed action was fraught with such grave consequences “that the irrevocable step must be taken only after the most thorough investigation”.

People at Murwillumbah had no such doubts. There the shops closed to allow attendance at a new state meeting which resolved that “we decline at all costs to continue to pay taxes and tribute to be spent by caucus-controlled Government.”

For his part, Lang immediately hinted at action for sedition, while the Empire Party, one of the new political groups that had sprung up in Sydney, also suggested that Page was guilty of sedition for promoting secession.

The stage was now set for the next dramatic phase in the North’s fight for self government. To understand this, we first need to look back at the economic, political and social stresses that developed with the Great Depression.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 29 October 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series