History revisited - the Premier greenlight's self-government referendum; the movement squibs

GAINING GROUND: NSW Premier Bertram Stevens (photo) tells Michael Bruxner he could have his referendum on self-government, but with decreasing support and continuing disputes over boundaries, Bruxner feared to put the matter to the test, a decision he would come to regret.  

In October 1931, the dream of self government for New England seemed within reach. The various new state movements had combined to form the United Country Movement with the United Country Party as its political wing, while all the non-Labor groups had agreed that new states should be a key plank in their combined platform.

David Drummond, the member for Armidale, had played a deciding role in those complex negotiations.

Unlike Page, Hardy or (to a lesser extent) Bruxner, Drummond was not a mass agitator. He had deliberately turned himself into a good stump speaker, perhaps better than Page or Bruxner in terms of delivery and clarity, but he lacked the emotional spark that allowed the others to sweep a crowd before them. He was too concerned to explain, to appeal to the intellect rather than the emotions of his audience. In a very real sense he wanted to teach his audience just as he had so painstakingly taught himself. 

These weaknesses were offset by a very major strength, his ability to give form and coherence to ideas and organisations. He was also trusted. In the chaotic conditions of the time, it was these strengths that were most needed. Drummond had played a key role in creating unity among the country movements. Now he would try to steer the cause through the next stages.

The December 1931 Federal elections saw the first setback. The unity that had been established among the non-Labor forces was swept aside in sometimes bitter campaigning, with Joseph Lyons able to establish a majority United Australia Party government in January 1932 excluding Page and the Country Party.

In NSW, the Governor Sir Philip Game dismissed Jack Lang on 13 May 1932. Early in 1931, the New England and Riverina Movement had been prepared to secede. Later, in changing circumstances, the decision had been reached that they would act if Premier Lang again breached the constitution.

Page saw Lyons in Melbourne. Lyons told Page quite bluntly that if New England did secede, he might be forced to call in the army. The movement temporized. There was still willingness to act, but only in the right circumstances. Game’s dismissal of Lang ended that option. They had waited too long, something many would regret. 

The NSW state elections of June 1932 saw Labor swept from power. On 23 August 1933, Justice H.S. Nicholas was appointed to determine the areas of NSW suitable for self-government.

After his earlier experience with his successful move to create the disastrous Cohen Royal Commission, Drummond was taking no chances. Not only was Nicholas carefully selected, but Drummond demanded answers in writing from Nicholas over his scope and role. The question of suitability was out. The only issue was definition of boundaries.

The first hearings were held on 18 October 1933, with Drummond organising the various movement responses. The fervour that had marked 1931 and 1932 was gone. Opposition emerged, with the position of the powerful Norco dairy cooperative particularly problematic for it feared the loss of the Sydney milk market.

Nicholas reported in 1935. He found that two areas would be suitable for self-government as States within the Commonwealth of Australia, a northern region, and a central, western and southern region, with descriptions of the boundaries of each region listed.

NSW Premier Bertam Stevens told Bruxner that he could have his referendum on self-government. With enthusiasm down as well as continuing disputes over boundaries, Bruxner feared to put the matter to the test.

Bruxner would come to deeply regret this decision. But, for the present, the cause had ended. It would be ten years before agitation re-surfaced.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 17 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the series.

Working Post - the counter culture movement in Australia's New England 1 - Introduction

In 1972, scouts from the Australian Union of Students came to the village and persuaded the Nimbin Progress Association to allow a festival to be held there. The result in 1973 was a ten day festival – the Aquarius Festival, a celebration of the dawning of the `Consciousness' and `Protest' movements in the heady days of the Vietnam war, free love and marijuana - a festival of discovery. The photo shows domes at the  Festival.

Nimbin entered Australian popular culture as a potent symbolic marker. However, it was more than that. From a New England historical perspective, it was a major marker that, in combination with other changes, shifted the local historical narrative. From an Australian perspective, it was the local manifestation of a global change process.

This post is the first part of a series tracing these changes. It will evolve over the next week or so as I sketch out patterns. As I add posts in the series, I will reference them here so that you can follow the story through. 

History revisited - Lyons splits the ALP: deal seems to place New England self-government within reach

1931 was a remarkably complicated year. My focus is on the fight for New England self-government, but that fight was taking place against a backdrop of economic and political turmoil that would reshape the Australian political landscape.

From 15 March 1931, NSW began to systematically default on interest payments, forcing the Commonwealth to make the payments instead. By the end of June, the net total paid out by the Commonwealth had reached nearly four million pounds. In June, Premier Lang accepted the Premiers’ economic reconstruction plan but still had no intention of resuming interest payments.

By the end of June, the State’s financial position had deteriorated to the point where, even after non-payment of interest, public service salaries could not be met from mid July. In response, the Lang Government introduced emergency legislation increasing income taxes by between 60 and 75 per cent. 

The defeat of this legislation forced NSW to go cap in hand to the Loan Council seeking financial support. The price was resumption of interest payments, together with Lang’s implementation of the Premiers Plan.

Under pressure, the Australian Labor Party splintered into Lang and anti-Lang factions, while Joseph Lyons (photo) led a group out of the Party to form a new party, the All for Australia League. In May 1931, the Lyons block merged with the Nationalist Party to form the United Australia Party (UAP) with Lyons as leader.

Hurt by internal dissent and facing a hostile Senate, the Scullin Labor Government became increasingly helpless. Late in 1931, the Lang supporters in the Federal Parliament combined with the UAP to defeat the Government and force an early election.

At local level, the New England leadership in April 1931 faced four related problems.

They had first to consolidate support for the separatist cause in the North. Secondly, they had to reach some measure of agreement with the other country movements as to organization, objectives and method or risk destruction by country in-fighting. Thirdly, the future relationship (if any) between the Country Party and country movements had to be defined. Finally, there was the continuing problem, how to push the separatist cause to a successful conclusion.

There is only space here to sketch key features. On 28 April at a first unity conference, the four new state movements agreed a common platform, although differences remained. This was followed by a second unity conference on 18 June that resolved remaining differences and created a central council. Then on 14 and 15 August complex and sometimes difficult negotiations saw the creation of a United Country Movement with the Country Party as its political wing.

In October, a unity meeting between all the main non-Labor forces led to the creation of a coalition agreement in which all parties including the United Australia Party adopted the Country Party platform including new states.

Action to achieve self-government for New England appeared within reach. It was not to be quite as easy as that.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 10 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,. 

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the series.

History revisited - NSW to be torn apart by five state solution

New Englanders know this place, the NSW Parliament, as their present parliament. It might not have been been, may not be in future.

The tumultuous early months of 1931 had seen the emergence of four self government movements – New England, Riverina, Monaro-South Coast and Western. This implied a five state solution, with NSW reduced to Sydney, the Central Coast and Blue Mountains with still to be defined northern and southern boundaries.

The relative size and economic power of the five areas varied, but the structure did make basic sense in geographic terms. You can see this clearly if you map the various administrative boundaries used by Sydney over time to govern a large and disparate state. Boundaries vary, but they all generally link to this five-fold division.

The evolving structure may have made sense in geographic terms, but there were considerable differences between and as well as divisions within the various movements. This was especially true for the newly re-emerged Riverina and long established New England movements.

The idea of provincial councils had become well established. During the decentralization movements of the 1880s, the idea of creating provinces within NSW had been put forward as an alternative to new colonies. Then in 1925 the Cohen Commission had concluded that the creation of provincial councils within NSW would address country grievances.

The provincial council idea was further extended by those who supported the abolition of the states and their replacement by provinces with delegated powers, a position adopted by the Federal Labor Party.

There had always been considerable support within the Riverina for the provincial councils’ model. Now in reaction to the Lang Plan, many representative argued that the only solution to the problem of a renegade state was the replacement of states by provinces.

The Northern position, carefully articulated by David Drummond in the aftermath of the Cohen Commission, was different. Provincial councils with delegated powers could not work, Drummond argued, because the central government would always override them as its political imperatives demanded. The only solution was to give the states (or provinces) their own powers.

In addition to differences on constitutional issues, the Riverina Movement was strongly influenced by anti-party, anti-political populist ideas that had flowered under the impact of Depression, leading it to adopt radical positions. These ideas were present within New England populism as well, but there they were tempered by and fitted within an articulated institutional and constitutional position

Personalities compounded the differences. Riverina leader Charles Hardy was younger, less experienced, brash. His offer to Page to campaign in New England ‘to stir up the people’ was greeted with indignation, compounding the personal tensions between Page, Bruxner and Hardy.

The political outlook seemed clouded in the extreme. It was left to David Drummond to find a way through the maze.

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 3 December 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,. 

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the

History revisited - other regions join the fight for separation

The 28 February 1931 Armidale meeting had placed the Northern Separatist Movement on the radical path proposed by Earle Page. But another and more radical movement was emerging that would create opportunities and challenges for the Northern separatist cause.

The Riverina Separatist Movement had collapsed following the 1925 Cohen Commission Report. However, Riverina’s political grass had now become tinder dry, ready to burn.

The Depression induced collapse in commodity prices caused acute distress in farming regions. Farmers were angry about the Depression related tariff increases that raised their costs. Then, in 1930, the Federal Government launched a disastrous grow more wheat campaign in an attempt to increase Australia’s export income. Increased production drove prices down, adding to wheat growers’ financial woes.

The Farmers and Settlers’ and Graziers’ Associations combined to form a new body, the Producers’ Advisory Council, to organise country interests. The Council held protest meetings across NSW demanding reduced Government spending, taxation and tariff protection.

The Council met with greatest success in the wool and wheat districts of the Central West and Riverina, areas hit hard by the grow more wheat campaign. In so doing, it prepared the way for a new Riverina Movement led by Charles Hardy, a Wagga Wagga timber merchant.

The thirty two year old Hardy had played a major role in Riverina activities, establishing a wide network of friends and contacts. A man of great personal charm with a magnetic personality, Hardy also proved to be talented agitator.

On 8 February 1931, a week before Page’s Glenreagh speech, thirty men from various parts of the Riverina including Hardy met in Wagga Wagga to consider what action might be taken in view of the deteriorating political and economic circumstances. They decided to adopt the Producers’ Advisory Council platform and to hold two mass protest meetings, one at Wagga on 28 February, a second at Narranderra on 7 March.

The next day NSW Premier Jack Lang announced the Lang Plan. As had happened in the North, this electrified the political situation. On 28 February, the day of the Armidale meeting, 10,000 people gathered on the banks of Murrumbidgee River near Wagga.

The first motion calling on the Government to affect immediate and drastic reductions in the cost of government, to relieve primary producers from statutory burdens and to prepare proposals for drastic reductions in interest rates was carried with wild cheers.

A second motion was then carried stating that if the Government did not accede to these wishes by 31 March, a referendum should be held on the question of Riverina secession. On 7 March, a 5,000 strong mass meeting at Narranderra carried similar motions.

Driven by Hardy, the new movement spread rapidly across the Riverina, with sister movements springing up in the West and Monaro. A new force had been born. 

Note to readers: This post appeared as a column in the Armidale Express Extra on 26 November 2014. I am repeating the columns here with a lag because they are not on line outside subscription. You can see all the Belshaw World and History Revisited columns by clicking here for 2009, here for 2010, here for 2011, here for 2012, here for 2013, here for 2014,.

If you want to follow the story of the Northern or New England self-government movement, this is the entry post for the whole series